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Abstract
Efficiency often carries a positive connotation. To be efficient, especially
in a job, is to get things done quickly and with little wasted effort. As such, it
makes sense that lawyers and judges see efficiency, especially in the form of
plea bargaining, as a normative good, particularly since it can be used in
individual cases to achieve fair results in an often unfair system. But this view
of efficiency masks the darker side of the efficient administration of justice,
which has contributed to some of the underlying causes of mass
incarceration.
To combat mass incarceration, reformers must think seriously about how
to break lawyers and judges of their efficiency mindset. Legal culture change
in criminal courts is unlikely to be driven by legislation, court action, or
lawyers and judges themselves. Instead, this Essay suggests other sources of
power that may break the efficiency mindset. By examining these sources of
power—both inside and outside of the legal culture—the Essay hopes to offer
some ideas for how legal actors might start to, or be forced to, re-envision
their role in mass incarceration.
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Introduction
Mass incarceration, like mass production of any kind, requires a critical
level of efficiency. The dramatic increase in cases in the criminal legal
system over the last several decades required legal actors to adopt efficient
methods of case resolution—namely, mass plea bargaining.1 But the rise of
plea bargaining as a substitute for adjudication by trial also required legal
actors to adopt a mindset that normalized churning out pleas in criminal
courts across the country. That mindset embraced efficiency as a
fundamental value that has, for the most part, come to trump other seemingly
more traditional values, like the pursuit of truth or public access to the legal
system. But as other scholars have argued, while mass plea bargaining
appeared to be an effective way to deal with heavy caseloads, it also,
counterintuitively, contributed to those heavy caseloads by allowing the
system to process many more cases cheaply and efficiently.2 The efficient
administration of criminal justice increased the number of cases, the length
of sentences, and the overall punitiveness of the criminal system.
To challenge mass incarceration, then, one must tackle the efficiency
mindset that is now deeply engrained among judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, probation officers, court clerks, and other system actors—lawyers
or otherwise—who touch the criminal legal system. The efficiency mindset
is often associated with productivity strategies in the business context,3 but
here I use the term to mean a belief that efficiency is a normative good within
the criminal legal system. This concept of efficiency further encompasses the
theory that, because it is a normative good, efficiency should be pursued,
particularly through plea bargaining. In the criminal justice system, lawyers
and courts seek to resolve cases efficiently, without wasting time or resources
reaching a conclusion.4 One can point to the many conditions or beliefs that
make efficiency so attractive to legal actors: caseload pressures, scarcity of
1. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in
America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2005) (reviewing GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003)).
2. See infra Part II.
3. A search of the “efficiency mindset” on Google leads to many posts and articles
associated with the benefits and drawbacks of an “efficiency mindset” for business leaders.
See, e.g., Arjun Vijeth, How Organization Could Incorporate an Environment Which Is
Conducive to Flow, LINKEDIN (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/flowworkplace-arjun-vijeth/ (discussing the difference between an efficiency and productivity
mindset).
4. The dictionary definition of “efficiency” is “the ability to do something or produce
something without wasting materials, time, or energy.” Efficiency, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/efficiency (last visited Apr. 20, 2022).
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resources, the belief that defendants are guilty and therefore procedures
should be dispensed with quickly, or even a fear of going to trial, among
other reasons. Whatever the underlying motive, there now exists a cultural
norm in criminal courthouses to resolve cases efficiently.
Nothing has proved to be so powerfully efficient for resolving cases as the
plea bargain. In misdemeanor courts across the country, but particularly in
large cities that process thousands of cases weekly, most defendants stand
before a judge for mere minutes before pleading guilty.5 Pleas are taken
quickly and with minimal discussion between the defendant and the court,6
and sometimes even with minimal discussion between the defendant and her
lawyer.7 The same often rings true at formal plea hearings, despite the fact
that these hearings are meant to establish that the defendant understands her
rights, that she is waiving them knowingly and voluntarily, and that a factual
basis exists for the conviction.8 One can see this efficiency mindset on full
display in courtrooms at the U.S.-Mexico border, where judges have
accepted pleas from groups of fifty to a hundred defendants at the same time.9
Indeed, the government gave these mass prosecutions a special efficiencyoriented name: “Operation Streamline.”10
5. See, e.g., ALISA SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THREEMINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 14–15 (2011).
6. Thea Johnson & Emily Arvizu, Proving Prejudice After Lee v. United States:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Crimmigration Context, 25 HARV. LATIN AM. L. REV.
11, 48–49 (2022); Jenia I. Turner, Remote Criminal Justice, 53 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 197, 257
n.334 (2021) (reviewing literature on the plea hearing length and finding that most plea
hearings last eight to ten minutes). This remains true as many courts have moved to a
seemingly more efficient online process. As Turner observed in her work on plea hearings in
Texas and Michigan, many of the online plea hearings last under seven minutes. Id. at 256.
7. Johnson & Arvizu, supra note 6, at 48–49. “Even in serious cases, defense attorneys
may only speak to their clients for a few hours.” Id. at 49.
8. See generally Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (establishing the
constitutional standard for a valid guilty plea).
9. Court: Mass Immigration Guilty Pleas Illegal, KRWG (Dec. 3, 2009, 10:05 AM
MST), https://www.krwg.org/post/court-mass-immigration-guilty-pleas-illegal. Although the
Ninth Circuit held in 2009 that the practice of mass pleas violated federal law, there is evidence
that such mass pleas still occur. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 700–01 (9th
Cir. 2009); Fact Sheet: Prosecuting People for Coming to the United States, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL 3 (Aug. 23, 2021) [hereinafter Prosecuting People for Coming to the U.S.],
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prosecutions
(“[The
government] conducts group prosecutions, sometimes prosecuting as many as 80 people at
once in the same hearing.”).
10. See Joanna Lydgate, Policy Brief: Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation
Streamline, CHIEF JUST. EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY 1 (Jan. 2010),
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Of course, one could look at the examples above and easily attribute them
to what might be called a cruelty mindset—that is, a belief that individual
defendants do not deserve full process or, even at a basic level, a chance at a
just resolution of their cases. As Alec Karakatsanis has compellingly argued,
lawyers have become party to the “usual cruelty” of the criminal system,
which allows them to avoid questioning the many brutal aspects of the
modern criminal system.11 Cruelty—and indifference—often play into the
criminal legal system. But the desire for efficiency (i.e., getting things done
quickly) is likely a greater overt motivator for many lawyers and judges than
malice or indifference. This is, at least in part, because maximizing efficiency
has been legitimized as a norm, even among those who see its risks.12
But efficiency and its progeny, plea bargaining, have very real costs. As
other scholars have argued, plea bargaining is tied to the rise of mass
incarceration specifically because it allows parties to efficiently process
cases.13 As in business, where efficiency means you can get more bang for
your buck, so too in the criminal justice system we have seen that quickly
resolving cases corresponds with an increase in cases, sentence length, and
punitiveness in general.14 The criminal system took its efficiency gains and
converted them into more criminal cases, just as a business would convert
efficiency into growth.15 And the participation of lawyers and courts made
this efficiency-based growth possible.16
Legal actors like plea bargaining because it is efficient for them in
individual cases or as a means of handling their individual caseloads. In the
aggregate, these individual decisions likely contributed to the rise of mass

https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf;
Prosecuting
People for Coming to the U.S., supra note 9, at 3.
11. ALEC KARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS IN THE
CRIMINAL INJUSTICE SYSTEM 149 (2019) (“The legal profession and the doctrines that it
produces exhibit a willful blindness to the extent of the physical and psychological
punishments that we perpetrate.”).
12. Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L.
REV. 183, 211 (2014) (“The pervasive adoption of adjudication strategies in service of
efficiency, especially plea bargaining, helps to redefine the norms that inform . . . ideas of
adjudication’s purposes . . . .”). Brooke Coleman makes a similar point about legal actors in
the civil system. Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 54–59 (increased caseload); infra text
accompanying notes 46–50 (sentence severity and punitiveness).
15. See Brown, supra note 12, at 189–94 (comparing efficiency gains in industry to those
in adjudication).
16. See infra text accompanying note 60.
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incarceration.17 But because efficiency drove individual rather than global
decisions, it may be difficult to convince legal actors that they caused and
now sustain mass incarceration. And ironically, plea bargaining has become
a primary way to avoid some of the worst features of our mass incarceration
system. It is through pleas that defendants can avoid harsh mandatory
minimums or devastating collateral consequences.18 This makes plea
bargaining appear not only efficient but also, at times, just. In addition, for
many legal actors, plea bargaining has become a matter of survival. As one
prosecutor put it, “That’s my water. . . . I can’t swim without it.”19 Like water
for fish, plea bargaining is fundamental to the survival of lawyers and judges
in the modern American criminal system.20
If plea bargaining is indeed responsible for creating some of the system’s
worst aspects, even as it counterintuitively helps avoid them in individual
cases, then legal actors must reevaluate their addiction to plea bargaining. A
significant part of that reevaluation necessarily involves breaking the
efficiency mindset as lawyers learn to seek justice without the quick fix of
plea bargaining. In this context, cultural change among legal actors is as
important, if not more so, than any legislative or judicial fix one can envision
(and, as I note in Part III, I do not think either of these fixes is likely
forthcoming).
But changing legal culture is hard.21 As public defender Jonathan Rapping
has described it (using another water metaphor), “Culture is like the current

17. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 12, at 202–04 (suggesting a cause-and-effect trend
between plea bargaining and mass incarceration).
18. I have written in other works about the role of plea bargaining as a means of
alleviating these injustices. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855 (2019)
[hereinafter Johnson, Fictional Pleas]; Thea Johnson, Lying at Plea Bargaining, 38 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 673 (2022) [hereinafter Johnson, Lying at Plea Bargaining].
19. Andrew Manuel Crespo, No Justice, No Pleas: Subverting Mass Incarceration
Through Defendant Collective Action, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2022) [hereinafter
Crespo, No Justice, No Pleas].
20. Id. (noting that the prosecutor in question, by his own admission, “cling[s] to plea
bargaining as a survival instinct”).
21. This Essay takes for granted that legal cultures exist, particularly within the criminal
courthouse. Although I do not explore it in this Essay, there is a rich literature regarding legal
culture in criminal practice, particularly how the “courtroom workgroup” shapes procedures
and outcomes in the criminal courtroom. See generally Marcia J. Lipetz, Routine and
Deviations, The Strength of the Courtroom Workgroup in a Misdemeanor Court, 8 INT’L J.
SOCIO. L. 47 (1980); JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1977).
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of a mighty stream,” and fighting against that current is difficult.22 Those
attached to the efficiency mindset (current judges and lawyers) are unlikely
to engage in meaningful cultural change.
So where might this change come from? In this Essay I suggest two
sources of power for shifting the efficiency mindset. The first comes from
legal actors not yet fully acculturated to the current model: law students.
While I propose integrating plea bargaining into criminal law curriculum and
training students on the risks of coercive plea bargaining, my focus here is
less proposal than observation. There is good evidence that law students are
already primed to change the system. Younger generations of public
defenders see their role more holistically than prior generations, and more
young lawyers are entering the ranks of progressive prosecutors’ offices with
a different vision of what constitutes justice.23 But even beyond those
students interested in pursuing criminal law, law students of all interests may
be resituating themselves in relation to the criminal system in ways that will
lead to broader change.
The second source of power comes from non-legal actors—namely,
defendants and their communities. Here I draw from the work of Jenny
Roberts, Andrew Manuel Crespo, and Michelle Alexander24 to suggest that
collective action stemming from outside the system may force lawyers to
change their perceptions and understanding of plea bargaining. Current
efforts by the Institute to End Mass Incarceration and community organizers
to coordinate plea strikes25 may force system actors to reckon with their
addiction to the efficient resolution of cases. As Michelle Alexander

22. JONATHAN RAPPING, GIDEON’S PROMISE: A PUBLIC DEFENDER MOVEMENT TO
TRANSFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE 82 (2020). Rapping continues with the following apt and
compelling metaphor:
Culture is like the current of a mighty stream. The force of the current determines
where the water will go. If a person wants to swim against the current, they may
be able to for a while. But only for so long. Over time, the pull of the current will
wear them down. The person will either get out of the water or be carried by its
flow.
Id.
23. See infra Section III.B.
24. See infra Section III.C.
25. See generally What Does the End of Mass Incarceration Look Like?, INST. TO END
MASS INCARCERATION, https://endmassincarceration.org/what-does-the-end-of-mass-incarcer
ation-look-like/ (last visited June 23, 2022) (“[W]e aim to support and to help build authentic,
robust, grounded community power that will enable the people most harmed by mass
incarceration to author the terms of its end.”).
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famously noted ten years ago in her op-ed for the New York Times, Go to
Trial: Crash the Justice System,
The system of mass incarceration depends almost entirely on the
cooperation of those it seeks to control. If everyone charged with
crimes suddenly exercised his constitutional rights, there would
not be enough judges, lawyers or prison cells to deal with the
ensuing tsunami of litigation. . . . [T]he system would crash—it
could no longer function as it had before.26
One way then to shift legal culture is to shift the conditions that make the
culture possible. Legal actors are attached to efficiency because they can be.
Plea strikes may have the power to change conditions and the culture growing
from those conditions.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I gives an example of the
efficiency mindset in practice and uses it as a case study to explain why the
efficiency mindset thwarts even modest changes to plea practice. Part II
explores the literature on why efficiency and plea bargaining contributed to
and now sustain mass incarceration. Part III then examines the sources of
power that may break the efficiency mindset. By examining these sources of
power—both inside and outside of the legal culture—the Essay hopes to offer
some ideas for how lawyers and judges might start to, or be forced to, reenvision their role in mass incarceration.
I. The Efficiency Mindset in Practice
To begin, what is efficiency? Definitions vary, but for the purposes of this
Essay, efficiency in the criminal system is often defined as producing
something—in this case, convictions or other case resolutions—at the lowest
possible cost, including the minimal use of resources and time.27 In this sense,
the criminal system has adopted a production definition of efficiency, where
the system gets more for less.28 One can resolve many more cases through
plea bargaining than trial.
This obvious fact has become something of a mantra for criminal attorneys
and judges. Indeed, as William Ortman noted in his historical work on plea
26. Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-thejustice-system.html.
27. Others have done much more work defining the efficiency mindset in the context of
litigation. For a fuller description of such definitions, see Brown, supra note 12, at 189–93,
and Coleman, supra note 12, at 1795–1802.
28. Brown, supra note 12, at 189–93.
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bargaining, the clear efficiency of the practice was at least one of the reasons
that lawyers and scholars eventually embraced it as a norm in the 1950s and
1960s after decades of skepticism about plea bargaining from those in the
field.29 And Carissa Byrne Hessick argues in her book on plea bargaining that
the drive for efficiency eventually transformed into a plea-bargain culture,
where lawyers and judges “expect[ed] cases to plea bargain,” even as crime
or caseloads dropped.30 This Part explores just one example of this efficiency
mindset among lawyers and judges in practice.
The Michigan Supreme Court recently proposed changes to the rules of
criminal procedure that would require the parties to establish a factual basis
for the charge of conviction.31 The court’s motivation for this proposal was
to avoid fictional pleas by defendants to crimes they did not commit.32 In its
request for public comment, the court asked interested parties to address the
impacts of fictional pleas on the truth-seeking process, sentencing goals
(including rehabilitation and crime deterrence), and the constitutional
separation of powers, among other issues.33
Stakeholders from across the spectrum submitted letters, including the
state prosecutors’ association, several defense attorneys, the State Bar of
Michigan, and the Michigan Judges Association.34 Every one of these
29. Will Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1484,
1486–87 (2020).
30. CARISSA BRYNE HESSICK, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: WHY PLEA BARGAINING IS A
BAD DEAL 29 (2021) (drawing from the work of Milton Heumann).
31. Order Seeking Comment on Proposed Amendments of Rule 6.302 and Rule 6.610 of
the Michigan Court Rules, ADM File No. 2018-29 (Mich. Mar. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Order
Seeking Comment on Proposed Amendments of Rule 6.302 and Rule 6.610],
https://perma.cc/H6B7-6LYK.
32. Id. As I have noted in other work, a fictional plea is a plea to a crime the defense
counsel and prosecutor know the defendant did not commit but that they allow to achieve
some other result, usually the avoidance of severe collateral or immigration consequences.
Johnson, Fictional Pleas, supra note 18, at 859.
33. Order Seeking Comment on Proposed Amendments of Rule 6.302 and Rule 6.610,
supra note 31.
34. See, e.g., Email from Anna C. White, Assistant Pub. Def. III, Ottawa Cnty. Off. of
the Pub. Def., to ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov (Apr. 21, 2021, 9:09:05 AM), https://www.
courts.michigan.gov/4a5545/contentassets/0bfa5a1e17f441c59ed928da0b1f0047/approved/2
018-29_2021-04-21_commentfromannawhite.pdf; Letter from Janet K. Welch, Exec. Dir.,
State Bar of Mich., to Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Ct., Mich. Sup. Ct. (June 28, 2021),
https://www.courts.michigan.gov/4a5693/contentassets/0bfa5a1e17f441c59ed928da0b1f004
7/approved/2018-29_2021-06-28_commentfromsbm-boc.pdf; Letter from Martha Anderson,
President, Mich. Judges Ass’n, to Larry S. Royster, Clerk, Mich. Sup. Ct. (May 6, 2021),
https://www.courts.michigan.gov/4a55f1/contentassets/0bfa5a1e17f441c59ed928da0b1f004
7/approved/2019-06_2021-05-06_commentfrommja.pdf.
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stakeholders objected to the rule change.35 In many ways, the objections
made sense given the risks of the rule change to the current system. 36
Fictional pleas serve as a safety valve in a system packed with mandatory
sentencing and collateral consequences that, many times, even prosecutors
find unnecessary to serve justice.37 Some letters noted the interest-of-justice
purpose behind such pleas,38 but many of the letters from lawyers and judges
returned to the same theme: the need for efficient plea bargaining.39
To illustrate, here is a sampling of the objections:
Changing the rule and requiring facts only for the [crime charged]
will make the options for a plea more limited and make settlement
more difficult. While having more trials may not always be a bad
thing, it will serve to frustrate the just, speedy, and economical
determination of every action.40
The benefits of negotiated plea agreements to resolve criminal
cases short of trial are numerous and well-known to this Court. . . .
Trial courts may move cases expeditiously through the system,
35. See supra note 34.
36. Because fictional pleas are a prior topic of my scholarship, I also submitted
comments. In the letter I, like nearly all other stakeholders, objected to the change because it
would likely lead to harsher outcomes for criminal defendants in the system as it currently
exists. But my letter also gave the court numerous suggestions for how to improve the system
so that fictional pleas could eventually be eliminated. The letter also acknowledged the deep
problems with a system built on fictional pleas. Letter from Thea Johnson, Assoc. Professor
of L., Rutgers L. Sch. & Russell Covey, Professor of L., Georgia State Univ. Coll. of L., to
Larry S. Royster, Sup. Ct. Clerk, Mich. Sup. Ct. (June 17, 2021), https://www.
courts.michigan.gov/4a5647/contentassets/0bfa5a1e17f441c59ed928da0b1f0047/approved/2
018-29_2021-06-17_commentfromtheajohnson-russellcovey.pdf.
37. See Johnson, Fictional Pleas, supra note 18, at 859.
38. Email from Anna C. White to ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov, supra note 34
(“Allowing prosecutors discretion in charging, and defendants an incentive and opportunity
to plead guilty and accept responsibility for a crime are a way to maintain the integrity and
efficacy of our system.”); Email from Michael G. Roehrig, Prosecuting Att’y, Off. of
Prosecuting Att’y, Monroe Cnty. Courthouse, to ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov (Oct. 1, 2019,
11:30:38 AM), in State Bar of Mich., Agenda: Public Policy Committee Via Zoom Meetings
(June 11, 2021) [hereinafter Agenda] (“These proposed changes would . . . create a problem
by impeding plea agreements for (factually unsubstantiated) lesser offenses because the
defendants would not be able to establish a factual basis to satisfy the elements of the less
serious offense. This would inure to the detriment of both defendants and the interests of
justice.”), https://www.michbar.org/file/generalinfo/pdfs/6-11-21_PPC_agenda.pdf.
39. See, e.g., Letter from Martha Anderson to Larry S. Royster, supra note 34.
40. Email from K. Edward Black, Alpena Cnty. Prosecuting Att’y, to
ADMcomment@courts.mi.gov (Sept. 26, 2019, 8:54:00 AM), in Agenda, supra note 38.
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allowing those defendants whose guilt is not at issue to waive their
right to trial and be sentenced quickly.41
Eliminating the possibility of taking proofs regarding the original
charge will make it more difficult to negotiate resolutions to some
cases. The busy schedules of many judges would be negatively
impacted by a court rule change that makes it more difficult for
attorneys and defendants to negotiate guilty pleas to reduced
charges.42
The proposed amendments would have the effect of upending the
current judicial system by reducing the number of plea agreements
accepted and dramatically increasing the number of cases that will
go to trial well beyond the capacity of our current system.43
Across the spectrum of legal actors, a clear thread emerged that a rule
change requiring defendants to submit a factual basis for the crime with
which they were convicted would dramatically curtail plea bargaining and,
as a result, the efficient administration of justice. Indeed, only a few letters
addressed the court’s concerns over fictional pleas, with some providing a
mostly cursory response. The letters did not address why false and fictional
pleas are needed, nor did the letters question the problems with a system that
relies on them. The rewards subsume the risks.
Of course, these lawyers and judges work in the trenches of criminal court,
and their responses make sense to those who practice in those same
courtrooms. Lawyers are not tasked with examining the normative
implications of fictional pleas; they focus on the real-world impact those
pleas have on their cases. And yet, even with this caveat, when lawyers and
judges are not pressed to think more broadly about the system in which they
operate, they are absolved of their “special responsibility” to consider and
maintain the “quality of justice” they dispense.44 The Michigan Supreme
Court encouraged lawyers to consider the conflicting obligations and
outcomes that arise when defendants plead guilty to crimes they did not

41. Letter from William J. Vailliencourt et al., President, Prosecuting Att’ys Ass’n of
Mich., to Justs., Mich. Sup. Ct. (Jan. 7, 2020), in Agenda, supra note 38.
42. Letter from Julie H. Reincke, Chair, Mich. Dist. Judges Ass’n, to Ms. Boomer (Nov.
1, 2019), in Agenda, supra note 38.
43. Crim. Juris. & Prac. Comm., State Bar of Mich., Public Policy Position: ADM File
No. 2018-29 – Proposed Amendments of MCR 6.302 & 6.610, at 1 (May 7, 2021), in Agenda,
supra note 38.
44. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
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commit.45 But in single-mindedly resisting these reforms, the letters provide
a compelling portrait of how strongly efficiency motivates practice, even in
the face of these other conflicts.
It is likely that many of the stakeholders who objected to the court’s
proposal—and its impact on their individual caseloads—also object to the
rise of mass incarceration in Michigan and throughout the country. And in so
many ways, plea bargaining in local practice achieves goals at odds with the
rise in mass incarceration. For instance, one response to my critique is surely
that plea bargaining provides a means of achieving lower sentences and
avoiding the worst of the criminal system. If not for plea bargaining,
defendants face the maximum penalty, which is often an extreme mandatory
sentence that no stakeholder considers just. Rather than increasing sentences,
plea bargaining decreases sentences for individual defendants.
Another likely response to my critique of the efficiency mindset is that
legal actors care so much about quickly dispensing with cases because new
cases arrive daily. The efficiency mindset is a survival strategy to handle the
relentless wave of criminal cases in most courtrooms. As I note in the
Introduction, plea bargaining is the water in which lawyers and judges must
swim to survive.
When these two justifications combine, plea bargaining can look very
appealing, as it seems to achieve justice while efficiently dealing with
massive caseloads. But as Part II makes clear, these justifications at the
practice level obscure how plea bargaining contributes to our system of mass
incarceration.
II. The Costs of the Efficiency Mindset
As several scholars have compellingly argued, plea bargaining may
contribute to mass incarceration by both increasing the punitiveness of
sentences and producing more cases for the system to handle. As Albert
Alschuler argued in Plea Bargaining and Mass Incarceration, “[P]lea
bargaining produces more severe sentences than would exist without it,”
because all sentences have been inflated to produce those guilty pleas through
bargaining.46 In this sense, the notion that a defendant receives a bargain from
the “fair” sentence that would be imposed after trial is simply a mirage to

45. See Order Seeking Comment on Proposed Amendments of Rule 6.302 and Rule
6.610, supra note 31.
46. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Mass Incarceration, 76 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 205, 205–06 (2021).
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support the plea regime.47 No one believes the sentence after trial is
necessarily the fair one.48 So, while the plea sentence might be reduced—
sometimes by many magnitudes—from the possible post-trial sentence, the
post-trial sentence is actually much higher than sentences for the same crime
even a few decades ago.49
Further, Alschuler makes the point that plea bargaining increases the
number of convictions, resulting in more people in prison.50 This part of the
plea process is deeply tied to its efficiency gains: “According to many of its
boosters, the chief virtue of plea bargaining is that it produces more
punishment bangs for the buck. . . . And by reducing the cost of imposing
criminal punishment, plea bargaining has given America more of it.”51
Carissa Byrne Hessick makes a similar point: “By eliminating trials, our
current system makes punishment cheap, simple, and predictable. So it
should not be a surprise that we punish more and more people; we’ve made
it very easy to do so.”52 Research by John Pfaff on the causes of mass
incarceration aligns with the idea that the roots of the problem stem from
more and more people being incarcerated, even if for short periods.53 Plea
bargaining makes it possible for the system to process more cases and
produce more sentences.
As Darryl Brown argues in The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal
Process, despite the common wisdom that rising plea bargaining was
necessary to meet rising caseloads,54 plea bargaining itself may actually
increase caseloads: “Criminal prosecutions are a variable that may be
partially dependent on adjudicative capacity. If so, efficiency gains in some
part contribute to the rise in caseloads, rather than the rise in caseloads
creating a need for greater efficiency.”55 This is particularly true because, as

47. See id. at 206.
48. See United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“To coerce
guilty pleas . . . prosecutors routinely threaten ultra-harsh, enhanced mandatory sentences that
no one—not even the prosecutors themselves—thinks are appropriate.”).
49. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 52 (2017)
50. Alschuler, supra note 46, at 210.
51. Id.
52. HESSICK, supra note 30, at 33–34; see also id. (“The spike in new case filings that
appears to have driven mass incarceration happened at the same time that trials all but
disappeared.”).
53. PFAFF, supra note 49, at 74.
54. See Brown, supra note 12, at 187.
55. Id. at 195.
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Brown notes, caseloads are not a fixed value.56 They can be shaped by a
variety of factors unrelated to the commission of crime, including the local
charging policy.57 Given this factor, at least one plausible theory is that mass
plea bargaining—made possible by the adoption of the efficiency mindset—
drives mass incarceration because it increases the demand for criminal
prosecutions, regardless of crime rates.58 This can be true, even as
prosecutors and other system actors feel overwhelmed by their caseloads.
The two aspects of the system feed into each other. Legal actors figure out
ways to process their own cases cheaply and efficiently without figuring out
how to decrease those caseloads systematically, so the cases keep rolling in.59
Brooke Coleman made similar arguments about the negative impacts of
efficiency in the civil system. As Coleman argues, lawyers, judges, and
policymakers adopted an “efficiency norm” over the decades that narrowed
in on “making each litigation moment cheaper,” without considering the
broader harms of those cost savings at the individual level.60 As her work
demonstrates, the efficiency mindset and its harms are not limited to criminal
practitioners.
When viewed in light of these costs, the arguments by detractors of the
Michigan rule change, although understandable from a day-to-day practice
perspective, are troubling from a global policy perspective. If we want to
move the needle on mass incarceration, we must tackle the pervasiveness of
plea bargaining. But how can reformers confront plea bargaining when even
the slightest rule change sparks such universal objection among lawyers and
judges? As Part III argues below, shifting legal culture is difficult, but there
is hope for change in some unusual places.

56. See id. at 199.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 186. In addition, as John F. Pfaff has shown, incarceration rates continued
to climb even as crime rates went down. See PFAFF, supra note 49, at 9.
59. As Bill Stuntz noted, prosecutors aim “to reduce or limit their workload where
possible,” including by “convert[ing] potential trials into guilty pleas,” which are “enormously
cheaper” than trials. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 505, 535–37 (2001). See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The
State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105
NW. U. L. REV. 261, 290 (2011) (describing the impact of prosecutors’ “excessive caseloads”
on the incentives for innocent defendants to plead guilty).
60. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 1821.
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III. Breaking the Efficiency Mindset
If breaking the efficiency mindset—and the corresponding addiction to
plea bargaining—is critical to ending mass incarceration, then the question
is, how do we root out a mindset engrained among criminal lawyers and
judges? As I argue here, reforms via legislation and caselaw are unlikely to
reorient lawyers away from plea bargaining. Instead, we need to examine
how legal culture might shift in ways that help, or even force, lawyers and
judges to re-envision a future where efficiency is not the prize.
A. What Will Not Work
Breaking the efficiency mindset is about changing legal culture, but such
change is unlikely to result from either legislative or court action.
Coincidently, neither is likely forthcoming. Let’s start with legislation. Even
in places where plea bargaining has been banned through legislation or rule
change, plea bargaining remains in some form, and often the worst parts of
the practice continue to thrive.61 This is because legal actors can and do find
ways around the boundaries of the law. I have no doubt that even if Michigan
were to successfully change the rules on plea bargaining to limit pleas to
crimes for which there is a factual basis, lawyers would continue to find
ways, surreptitiously or not, to proceed with pleas when there is no factual
basis for the alleged crime. As long as lawyers and judges on the ground
remain captured by the efficiency mindset, the rules will only provide road
bumps—not blockades—to reaching the desired end.
Nevertheless, legislation can have salutary effects on plea bargaining
practice and, by extension, contribute to the end of mass incarceration. As
Cynthia Alkon argues, legislative reforms that limit prosecutorial power in
plea bargaining are one way to fight mass incarceration.62 She suggests,
however, several other avenues for legislative reform, including revising how
crimes are defined, reducing felonies to misdemeanors, and eliminating most
mandatory sentences.63 All these solutions are important and should be
implemented because they lessen the state’s ability to coerce defendants into
a plea bargain.64 However, these solutions are unlikely to break the efficiency
mindset engrained in legal culture, because the conditions and beliefs that
encourage the mindset remain.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 101–07.
62. Cynthia Alkon, An Overlooked Key to Reversing Mass Incarceration: Reforming the
Law to Reduce Prosecutorial Power in Plea Bargaining, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 191, 201–08 (2015).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 207–08.
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Furthermore, these proposals and other significant overhauls of plea
bargaining are likely not in the cards—at least as a legislative matter. For
instance, despite wide bipartisan support for criminal justice reform efforts,
there have been many roadblocks to meaningful legislative change. While
the First Step Act, passed by Congress in 2018, was a huge achievement, it
focused on piece-meal corrections, like fixing archaic aspects of the federal
sentencing regime.65 It will not produce transformative change in the way
people think about the criminal system. Indeed, when it comes to plea
bargaining, the First Step Act’s changes to some mandatory minimum laws
may impact the prosecutor’s leverage at plea bargaining in certain cases, but
it is unlikely that the bill will change how most plea bargains work.66
Although criminal justice reform continues to be a focus of many state
legislative efforts, plea bargaining reform—or other reforms that would slow
down the pace of the system—are often not on the table.
Court action is also unlikely to make a difference. There are, to be sure,
places where courts could make meaningful changes to plea practice. For
instance, the Supreme Court could reconsider Bordenkircher v. Hayes, which
allows prosecutors to threaten grave penalties if the defendant refuses to
accept a plea deal.67 This sort of hard bargaining can be very persuasive in
convincing defendants to give up their right to trial. And although the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the risks of plea bargaining, it shows no
commitment to expanding the scope of due process rights at the plea phase.68
Similarly, lower courts also allow some of the most egregious forms of
coercive bargaining and do not seem posed to make changes any time soon.69
Even if courts were willing to take up the cause of plea bargaining, as with
legislative action, it is still unclear whether piece-meal regulation would shift
the efficiency mindset.

65. See Kara Gotsch, One Year After the First Step Act: Mixed Outcomes, SENT’G
PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/one-year-after-thefirst-step-act/.
66. See generally id.
67. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59, 365 (1978).
68. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 185–86 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the
United States, we have plea bargaining aplenty, but until today it has been regarded as a
necessary evil. It presents grave risks of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels
an innocent defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense; and for
guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a sentence well below what the law
prescribes for the actual crime.”).
69. E.g., United States v. Seng Cheng Yong, 926 F.3d 582, 591 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
that the government’s offer of leniency to a child is proper in exchange for a plea).
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The final question is whether lawyers and judges—on their own and not
pushed by changes to the law—will wean themselves off plea bargaining to
tackle mass incarceration. Scholars have argued about the role different
stakeholders play in ending mass incarceration.70 Prosecutors, in particular,
have received attention because of their power in the system.71 As Angela J.
Davis argued in The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration,
prosecutors must seek to reduce mass incarceration as a matter of
professional ethics.72 Davis focuses specifically on how prosecutors’
charging power at plea bargaining has contributed to mass incarceration, and
she encourages prosecutors to use that same discretion to mitigate the harms
of the current system.73 Andrew D. Leipold similarly argues that ending mass
incarceration requires prosecutors to be on board.74 As I discuss more in the
next section, Jenny Roberts has argued that defense attorneys can and should
play a role to “crash” the “mass misdemeanor” system by directing resources
towards misdemeanor representation and empowering their clients to reject
pleas.75 And Anne R. Traum has called on judges to consider mass
incarceration while sentencing defendants in individual cases as a method of
reform.76
While there are many compelling arguments in the scholarship that
lawyers and judges should reflect on mass incarceration in their day-to-day
decision-making, it’s less clear that they actually do (at least on a grand
scale). Given that the efficiency mindset appears to allay many of the harms
of mass incarceration, focusing on efficiency as a means of tackling mass
incarceration might even seem counterproductive to many stakeholders. And
for this reason, although there is much that lawyers and judges could do now
to start shifting culture, it seems unlikely those currently practicing will be
the most inclined to revolutionize long-standing norms.77
70. See, e.g., Crespo, No Justice, No Pleas, supra note 19 (identifying community
members as key stakeholders in the fight against mass incarceration).
71. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to End Mass Incarceration,
44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2016).
72. Id. at 1064, 1077–79.
73. Id. at 1070–77, 1081–84.
74. Andrew D. Leipold, Is Mass Incarceration Inevitable?, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1579,
1611–20 (2019).
75. Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089,
1097 (2013).
76. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 425 (2013).
77. I am not totally hopeless that lawyers and judges can push themselves beyond the
efficiency mindset. Indeed, I am the Reporter for the American Bar Association’s Criminal
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But ultimately, shifting away from plea bargaining as a norm will require
the stakeholders operating the criminal justice system to fundamentally
reorient themselves to that system. If plea bargaining remains business-asusual on the individual level, nothing is likely to change at the global level.
And for that reason, this Essay looks to other sources of power that may move
the needle on plea bargaining. I argue there are two potential sources of
power that could encourage change in this arena: law students and new
lawyers challenging the status quo from within, and defendants and their
communities challenging the status quo from outside.
B. Changing Culture from Within: Law Students and New Lawyers
The first potential source of power to break the efficiency mindset is the
next generation of lawyers. While law students have been co-opted in some
ways by the efficiency mindset,78 law students today are likely more aware
of the horrors of mass incarceration than students even a decade ago. They
have grown up in what has been often called the “era of mass
incarceration.”79 Students are engaged in movements that push not just for
Justice Section Plea Bargain Task Force, and much of the Task Force’s work focuses on how
to shift culture to make plea bargaining fairer and more transparent. I, of course, have some
hope that our recommendations will have meaning for current lawyers and judges. The Task
Force Report will be published Fall 2022. For more on the Task Force, see ABA CJS Plea
Bargaining Task Force, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_
justice/committees/taskforces/plea_bargain_tf/ (last visited June 23, 2022). In addition, for a
list of my recommendations on how to make plea bargaining fairer and more transparent with
discrete reforms, see Johnson, Lying at Plea Bargaining, supra note 18, at 729–31.
78. In a prior work, I surveyed law students about their perceptions of plea bargaining
and found that
[r]espondents focused on the role of plea bargaining as an efficiency mechanism.
As one respondent noted, the “main goal of plea bargains is to ‘unclog’ the
courts.” This was a common theme. Forty-one respondents [out of 239]
mentioned the terms—efficiency, time savings, cost savings, or ease—or some
combination of these terms, as the purpose or benefit of plea bargaining.
Thea Johnson, Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, 46 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133, 152 (2019).
79. Just a sample of works from the last fifteen years shows how frequently the “era of
mass incarceration” is invoked by authors, journalists, and scholars. See, e.g., Christopher
Wildeman & Hedwig Lee, Women’s Health in the Era of Mass Incarceration, 47 ANN. REV.
SOCIO. 543 (2021); Olivia Exstrum, The Era of Mass Incarceration Isn’t Over. This New
Report Shows Why., MOTHER JONES (June 14, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/crimejustice/2018/06/the-era-of-mass-incarceration-isnt-over-this-new-report-shows-why/; Nicole
D. Porter, Unfinished Project of Civil Rights in the Era of Mass Incarceration and the
Movement for Black Lives, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2016); Marsha Weissman,
Aspiring to the Impracticable: Alternatives to Incarceration in the Era of Mass Incarceration,
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legal change but for transformative cultural change outside of the legal
system. Abolitionism, once outside of mainstream discourse, has become
increasingly present on college and law school campuses and among new
lawyers.80 And if law students and new lawyers fundamentally understand
the criminal justice system in different terms, they may be positioned to
challenge the status quo.
There is precedent for young lawyers leading cultural change in the
profession. For instance, efforts in Latin America to move from an
inquisitorial to an adversarial model of justice have required a profound
culture change in the local legal communities.81 Regardless of whether one
thinks the move from an inquisitorial to an adversarial model is a good idea—
and the irony, of course, is that such a move introduced plea bargaining and
its ills into these newly developing adversarial legal systems—it was recent
law school graduates that led the charge in evolving the new culture.82 For
instance, in Ecuador, the office of the public defender was created in 200883
and from its inception was populated mostly by recent law graduates.84 As
the chief of that office explained, the criminal justice system experienced a
“total cultural change.”85 And it was young attorneys—especially at the
newly formed public defenders’ office—that many considered in the best
position to embrace this change, especially because they hadn’t been exposed
to the prior system.86 This has been true in similar legal transplant

33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 235 (2009); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2009).
80. E.g., Mary Retta, The Cops Off Campus Coalition’s Abolition May Is Underway,
TEEN VOGUE (May 11, 2021), https://www.teenvogue.com/story/cops-off-campus-abolitionmay (discussing the movement on college campuses to remove police from campuses). In June
2022, the UCLA Law Review hosted a symposium titled “Toward an Abolitionist Future” that
focused on abolition in its many forms. UCLA Law Review Symposium: Toward an
Abolitionist Future, UCLA LAW, https://www.law.ucla.edu/events/ucla-law-reviewsymposium-toward-abolitionist-future (last visited June 24, 2022).
81. Thea Johnson, Latin Justice: A New Look, WORLD POL’Y J., Sept. 1, 2013, at 57, 60.
82. Id. at 59–60.
83. See id. at 60 (noting that Ecuador had no public defenders before 2007).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 59–60.
86. Id. at 59 (“This lack of institutional memory is one of [these young lawyers’] greatest
assets.”). But see John D. King, The Public Defender as International Transplant, 38 U. PA.
J. INT’L L. 831, 859 (2017) (arguing that in Chile, lawyers in the public defenders’ office had
trouble “transitioning from the inquisitorial culture and expectations to an adversarial
culture”).
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movements.87 And while today’s American law students are not entering a
profession being transformed in the same way, the hope is that they can foster
their own transformation—one in which they feel directly responsible for
reassessing the norms and culture that allowed for the development of mass
incarceration.
Further, generational shifts in culture are already observable in other facets
of criminal practice. For instance, the heralded organization Gideon’s
Promise, which trains new public defenders from around the country, is
focused as much on culture change as it is skill-building.88 The founder,
Jonathan Rapping, has written extensively on the need to change culture
within public defender offices to make them more resistant to the quotidian
pressure to constantly “plead out” clients.89 As he argues, when leaders want
to shift culture, the newest members of a team are generally the ones least
devoted to the prior culture and most ready to embrace and push for change.90
Although Rapping writes about how leaders may utilize young lawyers to
develop a new institutional culture,91 there is good reason to believe that,
even without an institutional commitment to culture change, young lawyers
are still posed to be in the best position to move the needle on these issues.
Indeed, in my prior work, I have observed that even in so-called traditional
public defender offices, younger lawyers are more likely to take a holistic
view of the job—one in which they focus on all the harms that flow from the
criminal case, and not just the criminal case alone.92
87. In his article on public defenders in Chile, John D. King noted that after the public
defenders’ office was first established, the initial batch of lawyers was highly motivated and
committed to the mission of public defense. See King, The Public Defender as International
Transplant, supra note 86, at 857–59. Unfortunately, the job has transformed over time into
more of a “civil service job” that no longer attracts as many idealistic lawyers. Id. at 878. As
King argues, the lack of an adversarial culture is a major weakness of the current public
defender system. Id. at 859, 879.
88. See RAPPING, supra note 22, at 81 (“As I came to better understand the forces that
influence culture, I began to think about how public defenders could be organized into a force
to actually transform it.”).
89. Id. at 104–25.
90. See id. at 84–85.
91. Id.
92. I conducted in-depth interviews with twenty-five public defenders about how they
approach plea bargaining. Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J.
901, 903 (2017). In my sample, public defenders with more experience tended to view their
role as more traditionally focused on the criminal case alone. See id. at 928. Other work by
Ronald F. Wright and Kay L. Levine has looked at how prosecutors develop over their careers.
Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L.
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Furthermore, there is a role here for law students and young lawyers who
do not practice, nor ever intend to practice, criminal law. It is not only future
public defenders and prosecutors who are steeped in the many movements
for racial, social, and economic justice of the moment. In addition, future
corporate or environmental lawyers are as likely as future criminal lawyers
to have heard debates about abolition, even if they may be less likely to
engage in them. As lawyers of all kinds become more attuned to the horrors
of mass incarceration, it is likely that their attention will change the broader
legal culture, which in turn may shape the culture inside criminal courtrooms.
To be clear, academia can and should play a role in this transformation.
This is particularly true since, as Alice Ristroph argues, the traditional
criminal law curriculum offered by law schools for the last many decades has
played a role in the development of mass incarceration.93 For instance,
courses in criminal law have “legitimized criminal law by placing it in a
framework of supposed constraints and identifying the law’s rational
principles,” when criminal law has never functioned in this idealized way.94
Further, criminal law professors focus their students’ attention on the “the
minds . . . of criminal defendants, [but not on] the minds or acts of
enforcement officials.”95 As these students enter the legal world, they do so
with a mindset, language, and orientation provided to them in law school that
told them the criminal law is just, legal, and serves an important societal
purpose, even when the evidence says otherwise.96
As such, law professors today have an obligation to correct the record, so
to speak, and to reshape their curriculums in ways that reflect the reality of
the criminal justice system. Part of that obligation is to highlight for students
the connections between daily, normalized practices, like plea bargaining,
and the rise of mass incarceration. By connecting the individual decisions
students will make as future lawyers to larger societal harms, law professors
can help law students see hidden pressure points in the current system.
REV. 1065, 1065 (2014). Wright and Levine find that with experience, prosecutors become
less adversarial and more pragmatic in their approach to the job. Id. at 1099–1113.
93. Alice Ristroph, The Curriculum of the Carceral State, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1631,
1685–90 (2020).
94. See id. at 1688.
95. See id. at 1689–90.
96. A different sort of critique of law school that is also relevant here is that it fails to
teach the actual skills that students will need when they enter practice, especially with regard
to negotiation skills that are critical to plea bargaining. Jenny Roberts & Ronald F. Wright,
Training for Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1445, 1495–98 (2016); Cynthia Alkon &
Andrew Kupfer Schneider, How to Be a Better Plea Bargainer, 66 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65,
67 (2021).
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Indeed, one of the most insidious parts of plea bargaining is that it is
pervasive but hidden. As a result, many law students fail to understand the
problems with the practice and how it might relate to mass incarceration.
Luckily, law professors have many models, including Ristroph’s article, for
how to highlight these issues in the classroom.97
And yet, there are limits on the role that law professors will play in these
changes. Many criminal law professors were formerly criminal justice
stakeholders who were also steeped in a particular culture. In my own
academic career, I have struggled to separate the norms I learned in practice
from the ideals I want my students to pursue. And so, while I and others must
participate in the culture change, I doubt that law schools as institutions will
lead the charge.
Instead, it is likely that any push for change from inside the legal world
will come from these new lawyers that are developing their professional
selves in the context of broader social movements around racial and
economic justice, and the abolition of the criminal justice system itself.
C. Changing Culture from Without: Community Organizing and Plea
Strikes
Mass incarceration is so deeply rooted in our criminal justice system that
challenging it takes radical ideas. In this section, I explore how one such
radical idea—plea strikes—might be a fruitful path to ending the efficiency
mindset that facilitates mass incarceration. The idea behind a plea strike is
for defendants to refuse to plead guilty as a way to achieve fewer pleas and
more trials. The concept has been around for some time. In 2012, Michelle
Alexander suggested the idea in the New York Times.98 A year later, Jenny
97. The Guerrilla Guides to Law Teaching are a terrific tool to explore the intersection of
mass incarceration and several core doctrinal law courses. See GUERRILLA GUIDES TO LAW
TEACHING, https://guerrillaguides.wordpress.com (last visited June 24, 2022). Andrew
Manuel Crespo and John Rappaport have a forthcoming textbook, Criminal Law and the
American Penal System: An Introduction, which was created in response to the failure of
traditional criminal law courses to respond to the modern ills of American criminal justice,
particularly mass incarceration. @AndrewMCrespo, TWITTER (Sept. 22, 2020, 2:46 PM),
https://twitter.com/andrewmcrespo/status/1308492901022924802. The book will directly
tackle the relationship between mass incarceration and the substantive criminal law, rather
than leaving mass incarceration as an ancillary matter. See @AndrewMCrespo, TWITTER
(Sept. 22, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://twitter.com/AndrewMCrespo/status/13084929025
24489728 (“We come to the project motivated by a frustration, which we know many share,
with course materials . . . that treat mass incarceration and police power as at best secondary
themes.”).
98. Alexander, supra note 26 (discussing how the idea took root after a conversation with
Susan Burton, a formerly incarcerated organizer).
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Roberts applied Alexander’s idea to the crisis in misdemeanor courts,
suggesting defense attorneys create the conditions to make it possible for
“more defendants [to] choose trial over a guilty plea.”99
More recent work and advocacy by Andrew Manuel Crespo and Premal
Dharia at the Institute to End Mass Incarceration at Harvard Law School has
brought the topic back into focus, directing attention to how policed
communities can assert power through plea strikes.100 This section draws
heavily from the work of these scholars and advocates, and connects it to
strategies for breaking lawyers and judges of the efficiency mindset.
As the saying goes, one way to try to stop an addiction is to quit cold
turkey. If we apply this logic to plea bargaining, then one way to break our
addiction to plea bargaining is simply to get rid of it. Stakeholders have tried
in the past to get rid of plea bargaining. For instance, there are examples of
judge-imposed bans in different jurisdictions.101 States have also attempted
to implement bans.102 Alaska, for example, forbade plea bargaining in 1975
in the face of strong resistance from judges and lawyers.103 Somewhat
ironically, plea bans are sometimes put in place to fight both perceived
leniency towards defendants and to combat overly punitive measures towards

99. Roberts, supra note 75, at 1099.
100. Crespo and Dharia, along with community activist Brittany White, spoke about the
Institute’s work in community organizing and plea strikes at the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers’ Presidential Summit on the topic of the movement to end the trial
penalty agenda. The Constitutional Right to Trial: Organizing a National Movement to End
the Trial Penalty Agenda, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.
nacdl.org/document/111621_TrialPenaltySummitAgenda. For more on the Institute to End
Mass Incarceration, see Institute to End Mass Incarceration Clinic, HARV. L. SCH.,
https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/clinical/impact-defense-initiative/ (last visited June 24, 2022). In
addition, Crespo has written an article about plea strikes, No Justice, No Pleas: Subverting
Mass Incarceration Through Defendant Collective Action, which I draw from throughout this
Essay. See, e.g., supra notes 19–20.
101. In a pair of opinions, Judge Joseph Goodwin, a federal judge in West Virginia, noted
that he would not allow charge bargaining, the most common form of plea bargaining, in cases
that came before him unless he was persuaded that the plea was in the public interest. United
States v. Stevenson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 647, 648 (S.D. W. Va. 2018); United States v. Walker,
423 F. Supp. 3d 281, 282, 291–98 (S.D. W. Va. 2017). Prosecutor offices have also attempted
to implement plea bans. For instance, judges in El Paso, Texas, initiated their own plea ban.
See generally Robert A. Weninger, The Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 35 UCLA L. REV. 265, 267–68 (1987).
102. See Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-Evaluation of Alaska’s Plea Bargaining
Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 27 (1991).
103. Id. at 27–28.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/8

2022]

EFFICIENCY MINDSET & MASS INCARCERATION

137

defendants.104 And some of these bans were “successful” in that they largely
curtailed charge bargaining, the most common form of plea bargaining.105
But that did not always translate into fewer guilty pleas. In Alaska, evidence
suggests that there was no noticeable change in the number of guilty pleas.106
This indicates that these bans were not implemented with defendants in mind
and did not seem to slow down the number of guilty pleas. But, as many
commentators noted, the bans were also unsustainable.107 Eventually, most
bans gave way to business-as-usual plea bargaining.
But plea strikes are fundamentally different from plea bans because they
are meant to transfer power from judges and lawyers to defendants and their
communities of support. Michelle Alexander made this point when she wrote
that “[t]he system of mass incarceration depends almost entirely on the

104. The El Paso ban was instituted in response to concerns that prosecutors were being
overly harsh in their sentencing recommendations. For instance, prosecutors refused to offer
probation for burglary, “even if a seventeen-year-old boy with no record had broken into a
laundromat and stolen cigarettes.” Weninger, supra note 101, at 274–75, 274 n.36. On the
other hand, Alaska’s ban was put in place to deal with what were perceived as overly lenient
sentences for criminal defendants. See Carns & Kruse, supra note 102, at 42 (citing officers’
concern “that criminals were not being prosecuted and that victims were not receiving
redress”).
105. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2343
(2006) (“[W]hen Alaska introduced a total ban on plea bargaining, charge bargaining as an
institution was substantially curtailed as long as policy makers remained committed to the ban.
Similarly, a study of the plea bargaining for felony cases in El Paso, Texas also concluded that
charge bargaining was practically abolished, with a few authorized exceptions.” (footnote
omitted)).
106. Bryan C. McCannon, Alaska’s Plea Bargaining Ban 4 (Jan. 7, 2021), https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3761990 (“I show that there is no measurable change
in the difference between the rate at which civil cases and criminal cases are resolved prior to
trial after the policy is implemented. . . . [T]he pleas bargaining rate is not affected . . . .”); see
also MICHAEL L. RUBINSTEIN ET AL., ALASKA JUD. COUNCIL, THE EFFECT OF THE OFFICIAL
PROHIBITION OF PLEA BARGAINING ON THE DISPOSITION OF FELONY CASES IN ALASKA
CRIMINAL COURTS 204–05 (1978) (finding that, after implementation of Alaska’s pleabargaining ban, sentences remained the same for serious offenses but became more severe for
offenders without criminal records and those charged with less severe offenses). In 1980,
Alaska began to allow plea bargaining again in certain cases, despite the official policy that
plea bargaining was prohibited. See Carns & Kruse, supra note 102, at 35–36 (“The most
general understanding of the policy . . . is that sentence bargains are prohibited absent special
circumstances, but that change bargaining is allowed.”).
107. See, e.g., Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 776 (1998)
(“Alaska’s experience demonstrates the difficulty in maintaining a complete, long-term ban
on plea bargaining.”).
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cooperation of those it seeks to control.”108 Jenny Roberts noted that, while
lawyers obviously cannot force their clients to opt for trials over pleas, they
can “invite” those clients to “participate in a collaborative effort to change
the system by forcing it to bear some of the real costs of mass misdemeanor
processing.”109 In his piece No Justice, No Pleas: Subverting Mass
Incarceration Through Defendant Collective Action, Andrew Crespo focuses
on how individual defendants and their communities might end plea
bargaining, not through plea bans or defense attorney strategy, but rather
through their collective action.110 In this scenario, defendants would reject
pleas, knowing that they were supported in that endeavor by their
communities.111
Of course, defendants have an interest in an efficient system as well. Thus
far, this Essay has focused on legal actors, but defendants also often benefit
in individual cases from an efficient system. One might say that a
misdemeanor defendant—guilty or innocent—who will likely be held pretrial on bail benefits from a misdemeanor courtroom that prizes the efficient
resolution of cases and early “good” offers to defendants. Indeed, many
lawyers and judges would likely point to this scenario as an example of the
benefits of plea bargaining to fight unfair sentencing and bail procedures.
There are many other examples of defendants who are advantaged by
efficiency, including clearly guilty defendants who may get what could be
considered lenient treatment.112
But often, one can understand the benefits bestowed by efficiency on
defendants as a means of avoiding overly harsh punitive practices embedded
in the system. Meaning, what looks like a benefit is only a benefit in light of
the cruel system in which the benefit is doled out. Further, even where
individual defendants may benefit, as Part II discusses, the efficient
administration of justice negatively impacts defendants as a group. As
Crespo notes in his article, defendants often come from the same
communities, which means that their collective treatment carries collective
harm.113

108. Alexander, supra note 26.
109. Roberts, supra note 75, at 1100.
110. Crespo, No Justice, No Pleas, supra note 19, at 2002–04.
111. Id.
112. For more on how plea bargaining avoids many of the harms associated with the
criminal system, see Jeffrey Bellin, Plea Bargaining’s Uncertainty Problem, 101 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2023).
113. Crespo, No Justice, No Pleas, supra note 19, at 2007–09.
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But the fact that defendants come from the same communities is one of
the key features of Crespo’s proposal: if communities use collective action
to support large groups of defendants who refuse to plead guilty, they can
force change on the system that imposes such harms.114 And in this sense,
plea strikes may change the conditions under which legal actors function,
thereby pushing them to rethink their dependence on efficiency. This, of
course, would only happen in the jurisdiction in which plea strikes take place,
but to the extent that plea strikes were successful in drastically slowing down
the court system, efficiency would have to cede to other values. Part of the
advantage of relying on defendants, rather than lawyers, to initiate plea
strikes is because lawyers, even well-intentioned ones, are steeped in the
culture of efficiency and benefit from it. While lawyers, as Jenny Roberts
suggests, can and should aid plea strikes, they likely need a groundswell of
community support for such collective action to advance a culture change
among legal actors.
Of course, critics are likely to see plea strikes as creating worse outcomes
for defendants. Such action could lead to more pre-trial incarceration or long
post-trial sentences in cases that would have otherwise been resolved through
plea bargaining. Part of the reason that community support is so critical to
this endeavor is that individual defendants are taking risks by participating in
a plea strike, and their communities will need to provide a safety net to help
support them if those bad outcomes materialize.
But we should recognize that this critique of plea strikes is steeped in the
efficiency mindset, which limits the range of vision for legal stakeholders.
Part of the reason that lawyers and judges believe that plea bargaining is
necessary is because they have created a system in which it is necessary, and
they have trouble envisioning what a different system might look like. Plea
strikes force these actors to view the system differently, not as a matter of
thought experiment, but as a matter of practice.
Although there are obvious challenges to such collective action, if they
were successful, they could in individual jurisdictions provide a test of what
it looks like if you stopped the efficient—often frenetic—administration of
justice and asked tough questions about what is fair and right in each
individual case for each individual defendant. In the long term, such a
slowdown might mean a transformation of how legal actors approach plea
bargaining.

114. Id. at 2008–09.
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Conclusion
Efficiency often carries a positive connotation. To be efficient, especially
in a job, is to get things done quickly and with little wasted effort. As such,
it makes sense that lawyers and judges see efficiency as a normative good,
particularly since it can be used in individual cases to achieve fair results in
an often unfair system. But this view of efficiency masks the darker side of
the efficient administration of justice, which has contributed to some of the
underlying causes of mass incarceration. To combat mass incarceration,
reformers must think seriously about how to break lawyers and judges of
their efficiency mindset. As this Essay suggests, new lawyers not yet steeped
in the efficiency mindset might push for change within the system, while
defendants organizing through collective action can exert pressure from
outside the system.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/8

